Grenfell Final Report: Fire Safety Regulator Would Have Vast Powers

Decades of policy failures, an unsafe construction culture, and, most damning of all, dishonesty within the building cladding industry led to the Grenfell disaster – and, ultimately, to the death of 72 people in July 2017. As a result, the UK needs to establish a single regulator, endowed with massive oversight, who would report to a single secretary of state responsible for fire safety.

That is according to the final report of the Grenfell Tower inquiry, which determined the cause of the disaster, the role of construction firms, product manufacturers, and policy.

The inquiry led by Sir Martin Moore-Bick, a retired judge, set to answer the underlying question:

And while Sr Moore-Bick and his colleagues, namely Thourica Istephan, an architect and housing expert, Ali Akbor, found “no simple answer” to that question, their report, which totals seven volumes and more than 1,600 pages, found no shortage of culpable actors.

“The simple truth is that the deaths that occurred were all avoidable,” Sir Moore-Bick said whilst speaking to the report, adding that “those who lived in the tower we badly failed over several years, and in different ways, by those responsible for ensuring the safety of the building.”

In addition, those accountable bore responsibility “in most cases, through incompetency, but in some cases through dishonesty and greed.”

However, the report reserved its strongest condemnation for the manufacturers of rainscreen cladding: Celotex, Kingspan, and Arconic Architectural Products, the French subsidiary of US-based Arconic; Studio E, the architect responsible for the tower refurbishment; principal contractor Rydon; and cladding subcontractor Harley. In addition, fire safety inspectors Exova were criticised for leaving Grenfell “in a dangerous condition on completion of the refurbishment.”

According to Sir Moore-Bick’s report, construction industry regulation is “too complex and fragmented.” A range of functions—including the regulation and testing of construction products, licensing of workers on higher-risk buildings, and accreditation of fire assessors—are brought under the remit of a single regulator.

Wood Central understands the complete list of responsibilities for the regulator, including:

• Regulation of construction products
• Development of suitable methods for testing the reaction to fire of materials and products intended for use in construction
• The testing and certification of such products
• The issue of certificates of compliance of construction products with the requirements of legislation, statutory guidance and industry standards
• The regulation and oversight of building control
• The licensing of contractors to work on higher-risk buildings
• Monitoring the operation of the Building Regulations and the statutory guidance and advising the secretary of state on the need for change
• Researching matters affecting fire safety in the built environment
• Collecting information, both in this country and abroad, on matters affecting fire safety
• Exchanging information with the fire and rescue services on matters affecting fire safety
• Accrediting fire risk assessors Maintaining a publicly available library of test data and publications

Such a body would create “a focal point in driving a much-needed change”, enabling information to be shared effectively between those responsible for different aspects of the industry and promoting the exchange of ideas.”

While the inquiry noted the creation of a Building Safety Regulator in the aftermath of the disaster, it concluded that this body fell short of what was necessary to unite responsibility for the “dispersed” set of functions relating to the construction industry. 

Push to appoint a UK Chief Construction Advisor.

Instead, the regulator would consolidate all the functions divided across the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government, the Home Office and the Department for Business and Trade and report to a single secretary of state, with all functions relating to fire safety brought under this minister’s purview.

The report said this consolidation would provide an environment where “information can be shared more quickly and more effectively” and ensure that policy is developed “in a holistic and coherent way.”

In addition, it said that a minister with such responsibilities would “need to be able to turn for advice to someone who has a good working knowledge and practical experience of the construction industry” and supported the appointment of a construction adviser “with a sufficient budget and staff to provide advice on all matters affecting the construction industry.”

These responsibilities would include monitoring all aspects of the department’s work related to the Building Regulations and statutory guidance, providing advice to the secretary of state on request, and bringing to the secretary of state any matters affecting the Building Regulations and statutory guidance or issues affecting the construction industry more generally of which the government should be aware.

Call to review the definition of higher-risk buildings in the Building Safety Act

The report also suggested an urgent review of the definition of a higher-risk building for the Building Safety Act. Currently, a building is considered higher risk if it is at least 18m in height, has at least seven storeys, and contains at least two residential units. The inquiry said that defining buildings as higher risk by reference to height alone was “essentially arbitrary in nature” and therefore unsatisfactory.

“More relevant is that nature of its use and, in particular, the likely presence of vulnerable people for whom evacuation in the event of a fire or other emergency would likely present difficulty,” it said.

Further recommendations made in the report

• “It is made a statutory requirement that a fire safety strategy produced by a registered fire engineer be submitted with building control applications (at Gateway 2) for the construction or refurbishment of any higher-risk building and for it to be reviewed and re-submitted at the stage of completion (Gateway 3).”
• “These steps should be taken with the professional and academic community to develop new [fire performance] test methods that will provide the information needed for such assessments to be carried out reliably.”
• “That BS9414 should be approached with caution […] and that the government make it clear that it should not be used as a substitute for an assessment by a suitably qualified fire engineer.”
• “The construction regulator should be responsible for assessing the conformity of construction products with the requirements of legislation, statutory guidance and industry standards and issuing certificates as appropriate. We should expect such certificates to become pre-eminent in the market.”
• “That copies of all test results supporting any certificate [for products] issued by the construction regulator be included in the certificate; that manufacturers be required to provide the construction regulator with the full testing history of the product or material to which the certificate relates and inform the regulator of any material circumstances that may affect its performance; and manufacturers be required by law to provide on request copies of all test results that support claims about fire performance made for their products.”
• “That the profession of fire engineer is recognised and protected by law and that an independent body be established to regulate the profession define the standards required for membership, maintain a register of members and regulate their conduct.”
• “The government take urgent steps to increase the number of places on high-quality masters level courses in fire engineering accredited by the professional regulator.”
• Pending the creation of the new construction regulator, the government should “convene a group of practitioner and academic fire engineers and such other professionals as it thinks fit to produce an authoritative statement of the knowledge and skills to be expected of a competent fire engineer.”
• “That the government, working in collaboration with industry and professional bodies, encourage the development of courses in the principles of fire engineering for construction professionals […] as part of their continuing professional development.” 
• “That it be made a statutory requirement that an application for building control approval in relation to the construction or refurbishment of a higher-risk building (Gateway 2) be supported by a statement from a senior manager of the principal designer under the Building Safety Act 2022 that all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that on completion the building as designed will be as safe as is required by the Building Regulations.”
• “That a licensing scheme operated by the construction regulator be introduced for principal contractors wishing to undertake the construction or refurbishment of higher-risk buildings and that it be a legal requirement that any application for building control approval for the construction or refurbishment of a higher-risk building (Gateway 2) be supported by a personal undertaking from a director or senior manager of the principal contractor to take all reasonable care to ensure that on completion and handover the building is as safe as is required by the Building Regulations.”
• “That the government appoint an independent panel to consider whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by those with a commercial interest in the process” and “that the same panel consider whether a national authority should perform all building control functions.”
• “That the construction regulator sponsors the development of a […] library” similar to the Cladding Materials Library set up by the University of Queensland “to provide a continuing resource for designers.”
• “The government should establish a mandatory accreditation system to certify the competence of fire risk assessors by setting standards for qualification and continuing professional development and such other measures as considered necessary or desirable.”

Thousands of buildings still use unsafe cladding

Last week, Wood Central revealed that work on at least 2,300 residential buildings clad with non-compliant cladding has yet to start, with the UK Government revealing that more than 4,613 buildings have unsafe cladding.

According to UK government statistics, 2,414 social housing blocks had been identified to have life-critical fire safety (LCFS) cladding—with 664 buildings (or 27%) already fully remediated, 1,208 in the process of being remediated, and 717 yet to kick off works.

Last year, Wood Central reported that the Grenfell disaster had been a roadblock to mass timber adoption across UK mid-rise and high-rise buildings. However, after the UK’s leading insurance company Aviva expanded its coverage to include mass timber buildings, Alastair Ogle from Waugh Thielston Architects said the UK’s baseline understanding and knowledge about timber buildings had improved immeasurably:

“Aviva wants to embrace both: widening our underwriting appetite to insure commercial buildings using mass timber and using our risk management expertise to minimise associated risks,” according to Adam Winslow, CEO of UK & Ireland General Insurance for Aviva.

• To understand why the UK cladding crisis has been a roadblock for the uptake of timber in UK mid-rise and high-rise projects, click here for Wood Central’s special coverage.